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47 European Central Bank Working Paper SeriesAbstract
This paper analyzes the predictability of emerging market currency
crises by comparing the often used probit model to a new method, namely
a multi-layer perceptron artiﬁcial neural network (ANN) model. Accord-
ing to the results, both models were able to signal currency crises rea-
sonably well in-sample, but the forecasting power of these models out-of-
sample was found to be rather poor. Only in the case of Russian (1998)
crisis were both models able to signal the crisis well in advance. The re-
sults reinforced the view that developing a stable model that can predict
or even explain currency crises is a challenging task.
JEL classiﬁcation: F31, E44, C25, C23, C45
Keywords: Currency crises, emerging markets, artiﬁcial neural networks
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This paper investigates the predictability of emerging market currency crises
by comparing two non-linear models. In particular, the paper discusses the ca-
pacity of a probit model and a multi-layer perceptron artiﬁcial neural network
(ANN) model to predict currency crises with a sample of commonly used emerg-
ing market countries and crisis indicators. The main contribution of the paper is
that it introduces a new method for currency crisis prediction, namely the ANN
model. Similar types of ANN models have been successfully used in other ﬁelds
of economics and ﬁnance to detect binary outcomes, such as ﬁrm bankruptcies.
In addition, currency crises determinants and their stability are evaluated us-
ing diﬀerent subsamples to see whether currency crises of 1980s and 1990s were
caused by the same factors. Finally, the impact of a de facto exchange rate
regime on the probability of currency crises is evaluated using the data from
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004).
The main result of the study is that both the probit and the ANN model
were able to correctly signal crises reasonably well in-sample, and that the ANN
model slightly outperformed the probit model. In contrast to the ﬁndings in
the earlier literature on currency crises, the ability of the models to predict
currency crises out-of-sample was found to be weak. Only in the case of the
Russian crisis (1998) were both models able to signal its occurrence well in
advance. In addition, certain economic factors were found to be related to the
emerging market currency crises. These factors are the contagion eﬀect, the
prevailing de facto exchange rate regime, the current account and government
budget deﬁcits, as well as real GDP growth. Furthermore, it appears that
economic fundamentals were able to statistically better explain the onset of
currency crises in the subsample of the 1980s than in the subsample of the 1990s,
where other variables, such as the contagion eﬀect, were statistically signiﬁcant.
This conﬁrms earlier ﬁndings in the literature that the contagion eﬀect versus
economic fundamentals might have played a greater role in the onset of the
currency crises in the 1990s, in contrast to the crises of the 1980s. Furthermore,
our ﬁndings conﬁrmed the results of Rogoﬀ et al. (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2002)
that emerging markets with more rigid exchange rate regimes were less prone to
currency crises during the last two decades. Finally, the results reinforced the
view that developing a stable model capable of predicting currency crises can
be a challenging task.
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A c c o r d i n gt oB o r d oet al. (2001), the frequency of ﬁnancial crises has doubled
since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, but there is little
evidence that crises have become more severe in terms of output losses and
durations. Furthermore, both the IMF (1998) and Bordo et al. (2001) report
that low-income economies have experienced more banking and currency crises
than advanced economies during this time. Similar conclusions are drawn in
Ghosh et al. (2002), who also ﬁnd that currency crises are more prevalent under
de jure ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. Likewise, Rogoﬀ et al. (2003) ﬁnd that,
especially in emerging markets, currency crises have occurred during the last
three decades more often under de facto less rigid exchange rate arrangements,
such as the managed ﬂoating exchange rate regime. In contrast, they ﬁnd that
twin crises (both banking and currency crises) occurred more often under de
facto pegged exchange rate arrangements.
The unfortunate feature of currency crises, and more generally, ﬁnancial
crises is that they can be very costly. These costs include ﬁscal and quasi-ﬁscal
costs, misallocation and an underutilization of resources, losses in real output
and changes in distribution of wealth. Bordo et al. (2001) estimate that the
downturns following ﬁnancial crises have lasted on average 2-3 years and cost 5-
10 per cent of GDP. However, Ghosh et al. (2002) report that costs of currency
and banking crises have varied depending on the exchange rate regime.1 This
motivates the study as it is important to investigate the causes of past currency
crises and ways of detecting countries vulnerable to crises.
In the spirit of Berg and Pattillo (1999),2 who investigated the predictability
of emerging markets currency crises by comparing a ’signal’ approach proposed
by Kaminsky et al. (1998) and a probit model, this paper analyzes the pre-
dictability of emerging market currency crises comparing two diﬀerent models.
More speciﬁcally, the paper discusses the capacity of often used probit/logit
models to predict currency crises with a sample of commonly used emerging
market countries and crisis indicators. Furthermore, the main contribution of
the paper is that it introduces a new method for currency crisis prediction,
namely a multi-layer perceptron artiﬁcial neural network (ANN) model. Simi-
lar types of ANN models have successfully been used in other ﬁelds of economics
and ﬁnance to detect binary outcomes, such as ﬁrm bankruptcies.3 In addition,
currency crises determinants and their stability are evaluated using diﬀerent
subsamples to see whether currency crises of 1980s and 1990s were caused by
t h es a m ef a c t o r s . 4 Finally, the impact of a de facto exchange rate regime on
the probability of currency crises is evaluated using the data from Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ (2004).5
1Ghosh et al. (2002) found that, in their sample, per capita GDP growth rate under
ﬂo a t i n ge x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ew a sf a s t e ra f t e rc u r r e n c yc r i s e st h a nb e f o r et h e m . H o w e v e r ,
under ﬁxed or intermediate exchange rate regimes, crises caused substantial declines in per
capita GDP growth rates.
2See also Edison (2003).
3See e.g. a survey by Wong and Selvi (1998).
4One should note that in many of the analyzed economies, the capital accounts were
liberalized at the early 1990s.
5Also Rogoﬀ et al. (2003) evaluated this using the same data, however their approach
was diﬀerent as they only tabulated the occurance of currency crises under diﬀerent de facto
exchange regimes without conditioning the probability of currency crises on other factors like
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in this study.According to currency crisis theories, economic fundamentals aﬀect the prob-
ability of currency crises. However, whether the exact timing of a currency crisis
is predictable is another issue. According to the ﬁrst generation models of cur-
rency crisis,6 the exact timing of currency crisis is linearly determined by, and
therefore, predictable with economic fundamentals. In contrast, in the second
generation models of currency crisis,7 economic fundamentals also aﬀect the
probability of crisis, but the relationships can be non-linear. Furthermore, other
factors than economic fundamentals, such as ’herding behaviour’ and other types
of investor behaviour, can aﬀect the probability of crisis. Therefore, it may not
be possible to predict the exact timing of crisis solely by economic fundamentals.
However, the possible non-linear relationship between economic fundamentals
and currency crises motives the use of non-linear methods, such as probit/logit
or ANN models for empirical analyses of currency crisis. Thus, it also motivates
the study to analyze whether the more advanced ANN model could outperform
the standard probit model in currency crisis prediction.
However, there is an important issue of endogeneity linked to the currency
crises. Consider that economic agents follow an economic indicator that is ex-
pected to be linked to currency crises. Thus, crises can either be prevented due
to policy changes or, in contrast, they can erupt due to ’self-fulﬁlling prophe-
cies’. Furthermore, not all currency cris e sa r ec a u s e db yt h es a m ef a c t o r s ,a n d
other issues, such as political factors, can also play a role in the onset of cur-
rency crises. Another problem related to currency crisis prediction, especially
in emerging markets, is linked to the availability of timely and accurate in-
formation about economic fundamentals and other relevant factors, as well as
indicators that contain information about investors’ expectations about future
economic conditions. Despite these issues, many earlier studies have claimed to
be successful in predicting currency crises using economic fundamentals, which
will also be the focus of this study.
The main result of the study is that both the probit and the ANN model
were able to correctly signal crises reasonably well in-sample, and that the ANN
model slightly outperformed the probit model. In contrast to the ﬁndings in the
earlier currency crises literature, the ability of the models to predict currency
crises out-of-sample was found to be weak. Only in the case of the Russian
(1998) crisis were both models were able to signal its occurrence well in advance.
In addition, certain economic factors were found to be related to the emerging
market currency crises. These factors are the contagion eﬀect, the prevailing
de facto exchange rate regime, the current account and government budget
deﬁcits, as well as real GDP growth. Furthermore, it appears that economic
fundamentals were able to statistically better explain the onset of currency
crises in the subsample of the 1980s than in the subsample of the 1990s, where
other variables, such as the contagion eﬀect, were statistically signiﬁcant. This
conﬁrms the earlier ﬁndings in the literature that the contagion eﬀect versus
economic fundamentals might have played a greater role in the onset of the
currency crises in the 1990s, in contrast to the crises of the 1980s. This result is
possibly linked to the fact that many of the analyzed emerging market economies
liberalized their capital accounts in the beginning of the 1990s, which possibly
made them more vulnerable to international capital ﬂows than they were in
6See Krugman (1979).
7See Obstfeld (1986, 1995).
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(2003) and Ghosh et al. (2002) that emerging markets with more rigid exchange
rate regimes were less prone to currency crises during the last two decades.
Finally, the results reinforced the view that developing a stable model capable
of predicting or even explaining currency crises can be a challenging task.
The study is organized in the following way. Section Two brieﬂy summarizes
the related literature. Section Three discusses methodological issues, while sec-
tion Four presents the empirical framework. Section Five presents the results
and, ﬁnally, section Six concludes.
2 A brief review of the literature
Before the ﬁnancial crises of the 1990s, it was commonly held that currency
crises could be, to some extent, predictable with variables derived from the ﬁrst
generation models of currency crisis stemming from Krugman (1979).8 Authors
such as Blanco and Garber (1986), Cumby and van Wijnbergen (1989), Edwards
(1989) and Goldberg (1994) explored the Latin American currency crises of
the 1980s, for example the devaluations in Mexico (1982, 1986) and Argentina
(1981). They found that variables such as current account and government
budget balances, credit growth, foreign reserves, inﬂation, and real exchange
rates were related to currency crises.
In the early 1990s, there were several ﬁnancial and currency crises, e.g.
the EMS crisis of 1992-93, which could not be explained using the arguments
from ﬁrst generation models of currency crisis. This led to the development
of second generation models of currency crisis originating from Obstfeld (1986,
1995).9 Furthermore, it again raised the question whether currency crises could
be predicted with economic fundamentals. To tackle the problem, Eichengreen
et al. (1995), Sachs et al. (1995) and Kaminsky et al. (1996), among others,
introduced models with a broader set of explanatory variables. Kaminsky et
al. (1996) summarized the results of a large number of earlier studies and
found that the following variables had the greatest predictive power of currency
crises: inﬂation, GDP growth, exports, real exchange rate misalignment, money
growth, reserves, credit growth, credit to the public sector, ﬁscal deﬁcit and M2
to reserves ratio. In addition, current account, short-term debt to reserves ratio,
stock market growth, lending boom (credit to private sector to GDP) and the
world interest rate were found to be related to currency crises.
The Asian crises of 1997-98 motivated the development of third genera-
tion currency crises models with ﬁnancial issues from both banks’ and ﬁrms’
side being the key elements. Concepts such as the ’over-borrowing syndrome’,
’crony capitalism’, and ’moral hazard lending’ became known from papers such
as McKinnon and Pill (1996), Chang and Velasco (1998), Krugman (1999),
Aghion et al. (2001, 2004) and Burnside et al. (2004). In addition to economic
fundamentals related to currency crises, models explaining the propagation of
crises, i.e. contagion eﬀects have been studied extensively, see e.g. Forbes and
Rigobon (2002).
In the empirical works on currency crisis, the binary crisis variable is usually
related to the explanatory variables or ’leading indicators’ in diﬀerent ways.
8Agenor et al. (1991) review these models.
9Flood and Marion (1998) review this literature.
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bit/logit model. Examples of these studies are e.g. Eichengreen et al. (1995,
1996) and Frankel and Rose (1996). Recently, Berg and Pattillo (1999), Ko-
mulainen and Lukkarila (2003) and Kumar et al. (2003) have also analyzed
the predictability of emerging market currency crises using probit/logit models,
whereas Bussière and Fratzscher (2002) used a more sophisticated multinomial
logit model. All these studies conclude that certain economic fundamentals
(from the variables mentioned earlier) can explain currency crises, and the crises
of the 1980s and the 1990s would have been, at least to some extent, predictable.
Secondly, the other method is to consider t h ep r e d i c t i v ep o w e ro ft h ev a r i a b l e s
one at a time (univariate) so that a variable is considered to be a good leading
indicator if it gives a correct signal of crisis before the incident. This ’signal’
approach, or ’early warning indicator system’, was introduced by Kaminsky et
al. (1996, 1998), and further developed by Edison (2003) and Kaminsky (2003).
Finally, other recent approaches analyzing currency crises have been Fisher’s
linear discriminant analysis by Burkart and Coudert (2002), a duration model
analysis by Tudela (2004), and an analysis using ANN models by Frank and
Schmied (2003).10 In addition, Scott (2000) explored contagion eﬀects applying
an ANN model to Asian crisis countries.
3 Methodological issues
3.1 Deﬁnition of the crisis
In this study, currency crises are deﬁned using the concept of ’exchange mar-
ket pressure’ by Girton and Roper (1977). This way of deﬁning crises has an
advantage over the alternative deﬁn i t i o n so fc u r r e n c yc r i s i s ,w h i c hr e l yo n l yo n
extreme currency movements, because both ’successful’ and ’unsuccessful’ spec-
ulative attacks can be considered.11 In addition, the ’exchange market pressure’
deﬁnition of crises has the appeal that it can be used to analyze speculative at-
tacks under both ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes.
Following earlier studies,12 the exchange market pressure in a country i at
time t can be measured as:
EMPi,t =[ α%∆ei,t − β%∆ri,t] (1)
where ei,t denotes the price of a U.S. Dollar in the country i’s currency at the
time t; ri,t denotes the foreign reserves (excluding gold) of country i at the
time t and α and β are the weights that equalize the variances of these two
components.
10A study by Franck and Schmied (2003) uses a very similar type of ANN model to predict
Russian (1998) and Brazilian (1999) crises. However, their analysis is more event study type
and does not compare the results to an alternative statistical model like this study.
11The ’successful’ speculative attack means occassions where the currency in consideration
depreciates/appreciates strongly. The ’unsuccessful’ speculative attacks means occassions,
where the central bank has been able to defend the currency (i.e. the currency has not been
devalued/revalued) by intervening in the foreign exchange markets.
12Sometimes the exchange market pressure index also includes a term consisting of short
interest rate diﬀerential to the US. This term is, however, omitted here due to data problems,
as in many emerging market economies a representative market determined money market
interest rate is available only from the mid-1990s onwards.
9
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 571
January 2006The ﬁrst term, α%∆ei,t, measures the percentage change of the price of
a U.S. Dollar in the country i’s currency at the time t;i na n o t h e rw o r d s ,i t
measures the devaluation (or revaluation) rate of the nominal exchange rate of
the country i. The second term, β%∆ri,t, measures the percentage change in
the level of the country i’s foreign reserves. It has a negative sign because a
decrease in the foreign reserves is assumed to reﬂect foreign currency outﬂows
(weakening pressure of the local currency i) that the central bank attempts to
limit by intervening (buying the local currency) in the foreign exchange market.
Therefore, a positive value of the exchange market pressure index measures
the depreciation pressure of the currency i, while a negative value of the index
measures the appreciation pressure of the currency i.
A currency crisis is deﬁned as an extreme value of the exchange market
pressure index:
Crisisi,t =1 , if EMPi,t >µ EMPi +2 .0σEMPi (2)
Crisisi,t =0 , otherwise (3)
where µEMPi and σEMPi are the sample mean and the standard deviation of
the exchange market pressure index for each country i. Furthermore, currency
crises occurring within three months were considered as one crisis. This method
of detecting speculative attacks and currency crises is widely used in the em-
pirical works although it has faced some criticism, mostly because of its ad hoc
nature and due to the lack of a direct role of market expectations. To test the
robustness of the results, alternative crisis deﬁnitions were also constructed.
This is explained in more detail in section 5.4.
3.2 The data
The dataset consists of 24 commonly used emerging market countries,13 namely:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. The
time span of the monthly dataset was 12/1980 — 12/2001. However, in most
cases, the data was not available for the whole time period and the actual
dataset that was used in estimations was unbalanced and had a maximum of
3706 observations. The dataset already ends by 12/2001, because the data for
the de facto currency regime classiﬁcation by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) was
not available for later periods. Furthermore, as Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)
show, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the IMF’s de jure classiﬁcation
and the de facto classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes, especially in the hyper-
inﬂationary periods of 1980s. Therefore, it was considered important to include
the de facto exchange rate regime into the analysis with the cost of losing some
of the latest observations.14 Other data sources were: the IMF International
Financial Statistics 2/2005, J.P. Morgan (for real eﬀective exchange rates), and
13The coverage of countries in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging
Markets (EM) index is nearly identical to the sample of countries that is used in this study. In
addition to the countries in the sample, the EM index also includes China, Jordan, Pakistan,
and Taiwan. However, it does not include Ecuador and Slovakia.
14This is clearly a drawback as e.g. the ﬂoating of Venezuela’s crawling peg regime in
January 2002 and Argentina’s currency board system in February 2002 cannot be investigated.
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dependent variables was based on theoretical models of currency crisis, which
aim to measure domestic and external conditions15 of the economy. In addition,
all used variables have also been found to be related to currency crises in the
earlier empirical literature reviewed in section 3.2. Table 1 summarizes the in-
dependent variables and more information about the data can be found in the
Appendix.
Independent variables Formula
Ratio of government budget balance to GDP IFS line 80 / IFS line 99B
Ratio of current account to GDP IFS line 78ALD / (IFS line 99B / IFS line AE)
Measure of under or overvaluation of Real Effective Exchange Rate  (REER - HP trend of REER with a parameter of 14400) / REER
Real interest rate IFS line 60L - IFS line 64.X
Annualized growth rate of real GDP Annualized growth rate[IFS line 99B / IFS line 99BIP]
Annualized growth rate of real domestic credit Annualized growth rate[IFS line 32 / IFS line 99BIP]
Annualized growth rate of ratio of broad money to foreign reserves Annualized growth rate[((IFS line 34 + IFS line 35) / IFS line AE) / IFS line 1L.D]
Annualized growth rate of stock market Annualized growth rate[Composite stock index]
Dummy for contagion A currency crisis within 3 months in the same region
Dummy for hyperinflation Annual CPI inflation > 40%
Dummy for de facto pegged FX regime See Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004
Dummy for de facto crawling ped FX regime See Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004
Dummy for de facto managed float FX regime See Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004
Dummy for de facto floating FX regime See Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004
Dummy for de facto freely falling FX regime See Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004
Dummy variables for area
Linear and quadratic time trends
Table 1: The independent variables.
On this occasion, it is useful to discuss the data-related issues a bit more
in detail. Firstly, as has been the case in many recent papers investigating
the determinants and/or predictability of the emerging markets currency cri-
sis, the frequency of data was chosen to be monthly. This raises an issue, as
variables such as the GDP, current account or government budget balance, are
only available for emerging markets in annual frequency for long enough time
periods. Therefore, a common feature of many earlier papers has been that an-
nual or quarterly variables have been interpolated either linearly or using spline
techniques. In this study, the GDP, current account and government budget
balance variables were linearly interpolated into monthly series. While using
interpolated series, some econometrical issues might arise. However, economi-
cally, the greatest diﬃculty of using interpolated series is that by doing so one
uses information about future economic conditions that was not available to
economic agents at the time. In contrast, it can be argued that economic agents
often use forecasts of the key economic variables when they make their invest-
ment decisions simply because the actual information is not available. This
issue has been dealt with in earlier papers by lagging the interpolated variables.
In this study, the independent variables were lagged by a month16 to alleviate
this problem. Another problem related to the timing of the variables is that if
the independent variables were contemporaneous to the crisis variable, it would
15In addition, foreign debt variables (both total and short-term debt as a ratio of foreign
reserves and the GDP) were tested. These variables were not, however, taken into the ﬁnal
models as the foreign debt data from BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank starts only from 6/1990,
which would have shorten the sample considerably.
16All the models were estimated also using the independent variables lagged by 3 months.
See section 5.4 for more information.
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currency crisis.17
Secondly, an important issue that has often been neglected in many ear-
lier studies is related to the time series properties of the variables, as both the
discrete choice models and the ANN models18 require stationary variables. Al-
though many authors in the ﬁeld have constructed their independent variables
as ratios to GDP, deviations from a trend or as growth rates, there are econo-
metrical problems linked to hyperinﬂation periods and transition phases. For
example, the often used variables such as inﬂation, the ratio of M2 to foreign
reserves, nominal interest rate or the interest rate diﬀerential to the US, are
highly unlikely to be stationary throughout 1980-2004 in economies with hyper-
inﬂationary periods or transition phases from command to market economies.
In some cases, however, the question is not whether the series contains a unit
root; instead, the question is how the structural shifts should be taken into
account.
In this study, both standard univariate (augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981)
and Phillips and Perron (1981) tests) and panel (Levin et al. 2002 and Im et
al., 2003) unit root tests were applied. In all the univariate unit root tests, the
null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected at a minimum of 10 per cent level
of signiﬁcance in 17 countries in the case of the variable government budget
balance, in 21 countries in the case of the variable current account to GDP, and
in 22 countries in the case of real interest rate. However, both panel unit root
tests rejected the null hypothesis that all series are non-stationary against an
alternative that all series are stationary at a minimum of 10 per cent level of
signiﬁcance in the case of these three variables. In the case of the other variables,
both panel unit root tests rejected the null hypothesis at a minimum of 5 per
cent level of signiﬁcance. Therefore, the variables used in the regressions were
considered to be stationary or trend stationary.
The hyperinﬂationary periods were identiﬁed with a dummy variable that
received value one for the months in which the annual inﬂation rate exceeded
40 per cent. This deﬁnition is consistent with the freely falling exchange rate
regime classiﬁcation by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004). In contrast to many earlier
studies, the inﬂation rate was not used as an explanatory variable, as it was
expected to be integrated of order 1 in most cases. In addition, variables such
as the interest rate, domestic credit and the GDP were expressed as real series.
Some studies exclude hyperinﬂationary periods from their sample. This would,
however, limit the sample considerably and also cause some sample selection
issues if the hyperinﬂationary periods and de facto freely falling exchange rate
regimes were left out of study. In contrast to some earlier studies, variables,
such as (lagged) changes in foreign reserves or changes in exchange rate were
left out due to obvious collinearity problems as crises themselves were deﬁned
using these variables. Finally, a dummy variable was generated to proxy for
contagion eﬀects. Namely, this dummy was set to unity when another country
in the same area had experienced a currency crisis within the last three months.
17It is important to emphasize that this paper does not aim to investigate the causal relation-
ships between economic fundamentals and currency crises and therefore the abovementioned
relationships should not be interpreted as causal relationships.
18Some ANN models can be used with non-stationary time series.
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4.1 Probit model
Consider the binary choice model with a panel data (i =1 ,...,N;t =1 ,...,T).
The unobservable response variable y∗
it c a nb ew r i t t e ni nt h el a t e n tf o r ma s
follows:
y∗
it = xitβ + uit = xitβ + αi + νit, (4)
where the error term uit is disaggregated to the unobserved eﬀect αi and the
general error term νit. The observed binary variable yit is deﬁned by
yit =1 , if y∗
i ≥ 0 (5)
yit =0 , otherwise (6)
In the probit model case, the cumulative distribution is a standard normal:
Pr(yit =1 |xi,α i)=P r ( yit =1 |xit,α i)=Φ(xitβ + αi) (7)
The ﬁrst equality states that xit is assumed to be strictly exogenous conditional
on αi. Another standard assumption is that the outcomes yit = yi1,...,yiT
are independent conditional on (xi,α i).T h u s ,t h ed e n s i t yo fyit conditional on






f(yt|xt,α;β)=Φ(xtβ + α)yt £
1 − Φ(xtβ + α)1−yt¤
(9)
Finally, in a random eﬀects panel framework, the unobserved eﬀect αi condi-
tional on xi is expected to be normally distributed with:
αi|xi ∼ N(0,σ2
α) (10)
However, the assumption of independency of outcomes (i.e. crisis and tranquil
periods) is limiting and it can be relaxed by using the formula:
Pr(yit =1 |xi)=P r ( yit =1 |xit)=Φ(xitβα) (11)




¢1/2 is estimated from pooled probit of yit on xit using
Huber/White robust standard errors, meaning that the coeﬃcients are average
partial eﬀects. Another observation is that most of the independent variables are
transformed into growth rates, meaning that if the unobservable eﬀect (country
speciﬁce ﬀect) is expected to be time invariant, it will be removed through
these variable transformations. Indeed, the likelihood ratio test of αi =0after
a random eﬀects probit model could not have been rejected at conventional
levels of signiﬁcance. This conﬁrmed the chosen approach of estimating the
model using pooled panel. Finally, it should be emphasized that the probit (as
well as the ANN) models were estimated using lagged independent variables,
i.e. the probability of crisis at time t was predicted using information at t − 1:
Pr(yit =1 |xit−1) for the reasons mentioned above.
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Artiﬁcial neural networks (ANN)19 are multivariate nonlinear nonparametric
statistical methods,20 which have been used since the late 1980s in ﬁnance ap-
plications and lately in many diﬀerent economics research contexts, as in fore-
casting exchange rates, inﬂation and GDP growth. One of the deﬁnitions of
ANN is
... a neural network is a system composed of many simple processing
elements operating in parallel whose function is determined by network
structure, connection strengths, and the processing performed at comput-
ing elements or nodes. DARPA (1988, 60).
Several distinguishing features of ANNs make them valuable for function
approximation, forecasting, pattern recognition and classiﬁcation tasks. Firstly,
ANNs are distribution-free methods. Secondly, ANNs are suitable for problems
where the (economic) relationships are not known from the theory or they are
diﬃcult to specify. An ANN model is normally composed of several layers of
computing elements called nodes (or neurons). Each node receives an input
signal from other nodes or external inputs and then, after processing the sig-
nals locally through a transfer function, it outputs a transformed signal to the
other nodes or gives the ﬁnal result. The ANN models are characterized by the
network architecture: the structure and number of layers, the number of nodes
in each layer, how the layers are connected, and how the network is trained.
Many of the above features make the ANN models also subject to criticism.
Firstly, the ability and ﬂexibility of ANN models to ﬁtw e l lt ot h ed a t ao f t e n
raises concerns of ’overﬁtting’. Secondly, as for many nonlinear models, there
exists no ’closed form’ solutions for the ANN model, which makes it diﬃcult
to interpret the coeﬃcients in the way it is done with linear models. Thirdly,
in many cases the optimization algorithms of complex non-linear functions are
subject of ﬁnding locally optimal solutions instead of globally optimal solutions.
Therefore, the ANN models are sometimes called as ’black box’ methods despite
their sound statistical background.
This study utilizes the most often used ANN model called multi-layer per-
ceptron (MLP), where all the nodes and layers are arranged in a feed-forward
manner (see ﬁgure 1). The ﬁrst layer is called the input layer, where the infor-
mation is received in the ANN. Usually the input layer consists of as many input
nodes as there are independent variables. The last layer is called the output
layer where the ANN produces its solution.21 In between, there are one or more
hidden layers, which make the ANN models distinctive from other statistical
models. Finally, all nodes in the adjoining layers are connected by acyclic arcs
from lower to higher layers. Commonly, in the classiﬁcation studies, one hidden
layer structure is used referring to the study of Hornik et al. (1989), which shows
that an ANN model with a single hidden layer can approximate any continuous
function to any desired accuracy. In some cases, however, a two-hidden layer
19See Haykin (1999) for a comprehensive theoretical presentation of ANNs. In addition,
McNelis (2005) provides an excellent book of ANN applications.
20See White (1989) for more details.
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parameters to be estimated.
Figure 1: Multilayer-Perceptron ANN.
Like any statistical model, the parameters (arc weights) of the ANN model
need to be estimated before it can be used for forecasting purposes. The process
of determining these weights is called training. In most of the classiﬁcation prob-
lems, the used training process is supervised where the target response (currency
crises in our case) is known ap r i o r i . The aim of training is to minimize the
diﬀerences between the ANN output values and the known target values using
some loss function e.g. mean square error. The most commonly used training
method is the backpropagation (BP) algorithm popularized by Rumelhart et
al. (1986). After the ANN is trained, its forecasting ability can be tested on
another sample. This out-of-sample forecasting is called simulation in the ANN
literature.
4.3 ANN model speciﬁcation














⎠ = F(xht,θ), (12)
where Pr(yt =1 |xt) is the probability of a binary outcome yt =1conditional
on the information set xt at time t.T h e r ea r e( h =1 ,...,H) input variables xht,
each with a time dimension (t =1 ,...,T),a n dt h e r ea r e(j =1 ,...,J) nodes αj
in the hidden layer. Λ(a)= 1
1+exp(−a) are log-sigmoid transfer functions in both
output and hidden layers. αj and βhj are the network weights and α0 and β0
are the network biases. Finally, xht denotes a matrix of inputs (H × T), while
θ denotes the vector of network weights θ =( α0,α 1,...,αJ,β0,β11,...βJH)
0
The most widely used training method for ANN models is the error back-
propagation (BP) algorithm, which is a recursive gradient descent method,
22See Schumacher et al. (1996) for further details on the comparison of the artiﬁcial neural
networks and logistic regression.
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(yt − b yt)
2 , (13)
where yt is the target output, b yt is the estimated output value b yt = F(xht,θ)
with sample size T. The loss function is iterated until its minimum23 is achieved.
The iterative step of the algorithm takes θ to θ +∆θ, which is calculated as:
∆θ = −π∇F (xht,θ)(yt − F (xht,θ)) (14)
where π i st h el e a r n i n gr a t ea n d∇F (Xht,θ) is the gradient of F (Xht,θ) with
respect to the weight vector θ.
The standard backpropagation algorithm is often too slow for practical prob-
lems. Therefore, a notable faster variation of the BP algorithm, namely the
Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algorithm, was used.24 The main diﬀerence be-
tween the standard BP algorithm and the LM algorithm is that the LM algo-
rithm uses an approximation of the Hessian matrix. Otherwise, the network
structure was the following: First, the choice of the number of nodes in the
hidden layer was based on Hannan-Quinn (HQ criteria)25 when the model was
estimated using a diﬀerent number of nodes (from 2 to 10). The model was cho-
sen to be as parsimonious as possible to avoid ’overﬁtting’ the model to the data,
which would have meant a loss of generalization ability of the model. Therefore,
the number of nodes in the hidden layer was set to two (j =2 ) . Second, the
learning rate was kept at its default rate of 0.1 (π =0 .1). Theoretically, a too
large learning rate would lead to unstable learning, but a too small learning
rate would lengthen the estimation time. Third, the models also contained in-
put delays in order to take into account the sequential time order of the input
vectors, i.e. the ANN models were constructed as dynamic models. However,
the models were trained in a ’batch mode’ with all the input vectors presented
to the network before the weights and biases were adjusted.26 Finally, in order
to compare the forecast capability of the ANN models to the probit models, the
same independent variables (h = 19) and the binary crisis indicator were used
in both cases.
23The well-known problems of the backpropagation algorithm are its slowness in convergence
and its inability to escape from local minima.
24In this study, the estimations were repeated several times in order to ensure the conver-
gence of the optimization algoritm. However, ANN model trained with a genetic algoritm
could avoid possible problems related to local minima of the loss function minimization. This
is left for future study.
25Another way of choosing the ANN model is suggested by Anders and Korn (1999). Their
’bottom-up’ strategy starts with a simple network infrastructure and adds hidden nodes one
at a time to the ANN model until cross validation errors of the more complex model become
larger than with the simpler model.
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5.1 Factors aﬀecting to currency crisis
Factors aﬀecting the probability of an emerging market currency crisis were es-
timated using a probit model with robust standard errors. As mentioned above,
the data used was a pooled panel with independent variables lagged by one
month.27 Table 5 in the Appendix presents the marginal eﬀects (slope coeﬃ-
cients) of the economic factors and exchange rate regimes, as well as contagion
and area dummies on the probability of currency crisis. All the variables were
expressed in natural logarithms with the exception of the real interest rate and
the dummy variables allowing the slope coeﬃcients to be interpreted as elastici-
ties. There are four columns in the table: columns 1-3 present the estimates for
models that were used for in-sample predictions, while column 4 shows the es-
timates for the model that was used for the out-of-sample predictions. Column
1 shows the results for the whole sample of 12/1980 - 12/2001, while columns
2 and 3 show the results for the subsamples of 12/1980 - 12/1989 and 1/1990 -
12/2001, respectively. Finally, the model in column 4 was estimated using the
sample of 12/1980 - 12/1996. The models were estimated using diﬀerent sub-
samples28 to see whether diﬀerent factors aﬀected the probability of currency
crises in the 1980s and 1990s, and to evaluate the stability of the models. This
is because, the liberalization of capital accounts in many of the analyzed coun-
tries in the early 1990s is expected to have an impact on the crisis dynamics, as
countries have became more exposed to international capital ﬂows.
As can be seen from table 2, the signs of the estimated slopes are in line with
currency crisis theories. The economically most signiﬁcant factors increasing the
probability of currency crises are the proxy for contagion eﬀect, the prevailing de
facto exchange rate regime, an increase in the current account and government
budget deﬁcits, a decrease in the real GDP growth rate, as well as regional
factors. According to the results for the whole sample (column 1), the proxy
for contagion eﬀect is found to have the largest marginal eﬀect.29 Namely, a
currency crisis in the same region within three months is estimated to increase
the monthly probability of currency crisis by around 15 per cent. Economically,
this eﬀect is signiﬁcant. In addition, de facto rigid (pegged, crawling peg, and
to a lesser extent, managed ﬂoat) exchange rate regimes are associated with a
lower probability of currency crises. More speciﬁcally, the monthly probability
of a currency crisis is estimated to decrease by around 2-4 per cent when a
country operates under a rigid exchange rate regime. This result is in line with
earlier studies, such as Rogoﬀ et al. (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2002).
Turning to other economic factors linked to currency crises, a one per cent
increase in the level of current account and government budget balance (both
to the GDP) is estimated to decrease the monthly probability of currency crisis
by around 0.19 per cent and 0.13 per cent, respectively. This means that a one
percentage point increase of both ratios from their sample mean values (-2.1 to
-1.1 per cent and -2.7 to -1.7 per cent, respectively) would decrease the monthly
27All models were estimated also using independent variables lagged by 3 months. The
results remained broadly unchanged and are available on request.
28The subsamples for 1980s and 1990s have diﬀerent number of observations due to missing
observations.
29The dummy for contagion eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant only with the independent
variables lagged by one month.
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Similarly, a one per cent increase in the growth rate of real GDP decreases
the probability of a currency crisis around 0.07 per cent. This means that if
the annual growth rate of real GDP increases by one percentage point from its
sample mean of 4.1 per cent to 5.1 per cent, the monthly probability of currency
crisis would decrease by around 1.7 per cent. Furthermore, Asian countries seem
to be statistically more prone to currency crises, while, in contrast, European
countries seem to be less so. Finally, the marginal eﬀects of the real interest
rate and the growth rate of the ratio of broad money to foreign reserves are
statistically signiﬁcant, but economically very small.
The following observations can be made from the results when the subsam-
ples were used (columns 2 and 3). Firstly, it appears that economic funda-
mentals30 could statistically better explain the onset of currency crises in the
subsample of the 1980s than in subsample of the 1990s.31 Speciﬁcally, more
variables from the traditional currency crisis theories seem to be statistically
signiﬁcant in column 2, while in column 3 other variables, such as dummy
variables for contagion eﬀect and exchange rate regimes, are statistically signiﬁ-
cant.32 In addition, the model for the 1980s subsample has higher goodness-of-ﬁt
measures, such as the Pseudo R-square. This conﬁrms earlier ﬁndings in the
literature that the contagion eﬀect versus economic fundamentals might have
played a larger role in the onset of the currency crises in the 1990s. In addi-
tion, this also indicates that the liberalization of capital accounts in many of
the analyzed countries in the early 1990s has possibly made them more vulner-
able to international capital ﬂows than they were in the 1980s. Furthermore,
a regional dummy variable for Asia has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
marginal eﬀect in the sample of the 1990s, while a regional dummy variable for
Latin America has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect in the
sample of the 1980s. Finally, the slope coeﬃcients of the model in column 4 are
in line with the ﬁndings from the other subsamples.
To sum up, the analysis shows that certain economic variables were associ-
ated with the currency crises of the 1980s and the 1990s, and can have statisti-
cally and economically signiﬁcant impact on the probability of currency crises.
It seems that in the 1980s economic fundamentals derived from the currency
crisis theories were capable of explaining the onset of the currency crises. In
contrast, in the 1990s, other factors, such as the contagion eﬀect and the de
facto currency regimes, seem to have played a larger role in the occurrence of
currency crises. This reinforces the view that developing a stable model that
could predict or even explain currency crises can be challenging.
5.2 Issues related to crisis prediction
The ability of models to predict currency crises was evaluated using cross-
tabulations of correct classiﬁcations, as well as diﬀerent goodness-of-ﬁtm e a -
sures, such as Brier’s Quadratic Probability Score (QPS), the Receiver Operat-
30Also hyperinﬂation dummy was found to be statistically and economically signiﬁcant for
the 1980s subsample.
31It should be noted that in both subsamples, the share of crisis periods was roughly the
same: 3.66 percent in the 1980s subsample and 3.72 percent in the 1990s subsample.
32When the model was estimated using the subsample of the 1990s and using the inde-
pendent variables lagged one period (column 3), the marginal eﬀect of currency crisis in the
region was estimated to be 0.18 (18 percent).
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out-of-sample predicted probabilities for the countries were plotted to illustrate
the ability of the models to predict crisis.
Certain issues are related to the evaluation of the predictive ability of the
models. First, in the binary choice models, the choice of the probability thresh-
old is critical. As Greene (2000, 833) states, the usual threshold value of 50
per cent may not be a good value if the binary outcomes in the sample are un-
evenly distributed, as it may lead to a severe understatement of the prediction
ability of the model. In the sample used in this study, the share of crisis and
tranquil periods were around 3 per cent and 97 per cent, respectively.33 There-
fore, the ability of the model to predict currency crises was evaluated using four
diﬀerent threshold values: 0.50, 0.25, 0.15 and 0.10. Secondly, as mentioned in
the introduction, the costs of currency crises can be substantial, and therefore,
the costs of giving wrong signals of crises and tranquil periods are asymmetric.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, according to the second generation of cur-
rency crisis, worsening economic fundamentals can expose countries to currency
crises although the exact timing of currency crises might be diﬃcult to deter-
mine. Therefore, the predictive ability of the models were evaluated separately
for two cases. On the one hand, the model was considered to have success-
fully predicted the crisis if the predicted probability was above the set threshold
value at exactly the timing of the crisis. On the other hand, the model was
considered to successfully signal the crisis if the predicted probability was above
t h es e tt h r e s h o l dw i t h i n3m o n t h s(t − 3) before the actual crisis period. Many
earlier studies use these ’crisis windows’ of 12 or 24 months to ’improve’ the
predictability of the models. In addition, in some studies, the sample size has
been reduced only to cover certain crisis windows. In this study these measures
were not applied, as the main purpose of the study was to objectively evaluate
whether the estimated models could predict currency crises.
Finally, as both the probit and the ANN model are estimated using the inde-
pendent variables lagged by one month, in each time, the predicted probability
of crisis is a one-month ahead forecasts. However, as in the case of in-sample
estimations, the information set is larger than the economic agents had at each
time, and therefore, the true predictive power of the models was evaluated using
the out-of-sample forecasts.
5.3 Predicting currency crises
The results of the in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts are presented in the
Appendix in sections 7.4 and 7.5, while the goodness-of-ﬁt measures are pre-
sented in section 7.6. The obtained results are benchmarked to earlier studies
in section 7.7. Finally, the graphs of one month ahead predicted probabilities
are shown in section 7.8.
The following observations can be made from the in-sample forecasts (tables
6-9). Firstly, the signals of the currency crises are stronger from the ANN model
than from the probit model, meaning that predicted probability levels in the
crisis periods are higher in the ANN model than in probit model. Therefore, the
choice of the threshold value is less relevant in the case of ANN models, while
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the threshold value of 0.50, the probit model would have predicted only 5 crises
(3.7 per cent of the crises), while the ANN model would have predicted 47 crises
(34.6 per cent of the crises). Lowering the threshold value to 0.10 increases the
share of predicted crises with the probit model to nearly 48 per cent, while in
the case of the ANN model the share of the crises predicted is around 45 per
cent between the thresholds of 0.25 and 0.10.
Secondly, the signals of the currency crises are more accurate from the ANN
model than from the probit model. This can be seen from the fact that when
t h et h r e s h o l dv a l u ei ss e tl o w e ri n ,t h es p e c i ﬁcity of the model (the ability of
the model to detect tranquil periods) decreases meaning the probit model gives
more wrong signals of the crises than the ANN model.
Thirdly, when the signals of crisis are evaluated within a window of t−3 to
t (tables 8 and 9), it can be seen that part of the ’wrong signals’ of the probit
model are actually correct signals of the forthcoming crises as the number of
predicted crises increases with the probit model. As mentioned earlier, the
signals from the ANN model are more accurate and therefore the share of the
p r e d i c t e dc r i s e sa sw e l la st h et r a n q u i lp e r i o d sr e m a i n ss t a b l e .
Fourthly, as noted earlier, the models ﬁt the sample of 1980s (model 2) better
than the whole sample (model 1) or the sample of 1990s (model 3) and therefore
the share of predicted crises, as well as the other goodness-of-ﬁt measures are
the highest with the model 2.
Finally, the goodness-of-ﬁt measures point out that the ANN model ﬁts the
data slightly better. All in all, as the in-sample predictions show, both the
probit and the ANN model correctly signalled (one month ahead) 4 to 52 per
cent of the crises periods depending on the choice of the threshold, meaning
that the models ﬁtted the data quite well. This observation is conﬁrmed when
the graphs of the predicted probabilities are analyzed (section 7.8, the upper
ﬁgures). Both the probit and the ANN model seem to correctly signal the Latin
American crises at the turn of the 1990s, as well as the Asian crises of 1997 and
the Russian crises of 1998. However, the true ability of the models to predict
crises need to be evaluated using out-of-sample forecasts and the results from
the in-sample forecasts can be thought of only as a measure of goodness-of-ﬁt
of the models.
The results from out-of-sample forecasts are shown in tables 10 and 11. Both
the probit and the ANN model were estimated using the sample of 12/1980 -
12/1996 and the out-of-sample forecasts were calculated using the sample of
1/1997 - 12/2001. The out-of-sample forecasts were calculated using simple
static models, meaning that the coeﬃcients were not re-estimated recursively
after each time period. The choice of using a static model to forecast has the
drawback that it ignores the latest available information, as the coeﬃcients are
not updated after each time period. However, the static models allow us to
better evaluate the ability of the model to generalize with diﬀerent datasets
than the recursive model. In addition, the static model also partly alleviates
the problem that the interpolation of some variables might cause, namely that
the statistician and the economic agent have diﬀerent information sets available.
Turning to the results, the out-of-sample data contains 56 crises periods34
34The mean probability of currency crises in the out-of-sample data was slightly higher than
in the in-sample subsets of the data, namely 4.38 percent.
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 571
January 2006of which the models were able to predict a maximum of 4 periods using the
lowest threshold value of 0.10. In addition, the other goodness-of-ﬁt measures
also point out that the out-of-sample forecasts are not particularly strong. Es-
pecially, the Pearson’s chi-squared test for the hypothesis that the predicted
and actual outcomes (crisis and tranquil periods) are independent could not be
rejected in most cases of the out-of-sample predictions, while it was rejected in
all cases of the in-sample predictions. However, when the graphs of the out-of-
sample forecasts are evaluated, it can be noted that both the probit and the
ANN models correctly forecasted the Russian crisis of 1998 out-of-sample. Fur-
thermore, the ANN model was capable of signalling, to some extent, the onset
of speculative attacks in Slovakia in 1999 and in Turkey in 2001.
Tables 13 and 14 are constructed to compare the results to some selected
earlier papers. Obviously, the comparison of results between diﬀerent papers is
not straightforward as the estimation samples, countries included, the threshold
values as well as the crisis windows diﬀer. However, it has become a standard to
benchmark the obtained results to the ’signal approach’ developed by Kaminsky
et al. (1998), as well as to a standard probit model. Both of these models
have been estimated by Berg and Pattillo (1999), whose results will be used to
benchmark the obtained results. Furthermore, the in-sample ﬁt is also analyzed
in contrast to an innovative multinominal logit model by Bussière and Fratzscher
(2002), while the out-of-sample forecasting potential is compared to a recent
panel probit model by Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003). One should note that
only a limited number of earlier studies have reported thoroughly their in- and
out-of-sample results, which limits the deep comparison of results to the earlier
literature. Furthermore, in most cases the out-of-sample forecasts are limited
to case studies, such as in Frank and Schmied (2003) or Scott (2000).
As can be seen from the tables 13 and 14, the obtained results in the in-
sample predictions were in line with the earlier papers, while the out-of-sample
predictions were found to be much weaker than earlier found in the literature.
The relatively strong in-sample performance indicates that the estimated models
were correctly speciﬁed. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next section,
the results are robust to various modiﬁcations of the models. Therefore, the
most likely reason for the diverging out-of-sample results from the earlier studies
is that the models were required to predict crises truly out-of-sample without
using information that was potentially not available to economic agents at the
time. In addition, the models were classiﬁed as being able to predict crises
correctly only if the predicted crisis probabilities were above the set threshold
v a l u ew i t h i nam a x i m u mt i m ew i n d o wo ft − 3 to t. This time window is
signiﬁcantly narrower than in most studies which often use a time window of
t−12 to t. The use of very wide crisis windows can be questionable on statistical
grounds despite they might be economically appealing. In addition, some earlier
studies have trimmed the samples to include only a certain number of tranquil
period observations around crises in order to rebalance the share of crises in
the sample to ease the estimation procedure. Finally, some earlier studies have
also adjusted the crisis thresholds, in order to maximize the number of crises
predicted. All these factors can explain why the obtained out-of-sample results
were weaker than in the earlier literature.
To sum up, early warning indicator models can be useful to identify un-
derlying economic problems associated with currency crises and they can be
used explain occurred currency crises ex post. However, due to the endogeneity
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economy, ﬁnding a stable model to predict currency crises out-of-sample can be
a challenging task.
5.4 Robustness of results
The robustness of the results were tested in various ways. Firstly, the currency
crises were deﬁned using a diﬀerent threshold for exchange market pressure
index, namely 1.5σEMPi instead of 2.0σEMPi. Secondly, all the separate crises
periods were considered as diﬀerent crises in contrast to the used method that
crises within three months were considered as one crisis. Thirdly, all models
were estimated using the independent variables lagged by three months instead
of the base line models with one month lagged independent variables. Fourthly,
the probit models were estimated using random eﬀects speciﬁcation. Fifthly,
the ANN models were estimated using diﬀerent numbers of nodes in the hidden
layer. Finally, all models were estimated using three diﬀerent subsamples as
reported above. All in all, the basic results remained unchanged throughout
these robustness tests. It was noted that the biggest problem with the ANN
model was that the training algorithm could sometimes not ﬁnd the global
minimum of the loss function, which is a well-known problem of backpropagation
algorithms. However, the training of the ANN model with a global search
method, such as genetic algorithms, is left for future studies.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The purpose of this study was to examine the predictability of the emerging
market currency crises of the last two decades with two models, namely a often
used probit model and a multi-layer perceptron Artiﬁcial Neural Network model.
This paper is one of the ﬁrst applications of the artiﬁcial neural networks in
the currency crisis literature context. Furthermore, factors aﬀecting currency
crises were evaluated with a special focus on the economic fundamentals derived
from the currency crises theories, as well as on de facto exchange rate regime
and contagion eﬀects. According to the results, both the probit and the ANN
models were able to signal in-sample correctly around 45 per cent of the emerging
market currency crises of the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, it was found that
economic fundamentals could statistically better explain the onset of currency
crises in the subsample of the 1980s than in subsample of the 1990s, where other
variables, such as the contagion eﬀect, were found to be statistically signiﬁcant.
This veriﬁes the earlier ﬁndings in the literature that the contagion eﬀect versus
economic fundamentals might have a larger role in the onset of the currency
crises in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Furthermore, our ﬁndings conﬁrmed the
results of Rogoﬀ et al. (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2002) that emerging markets
with more rigid exchange rate regimes were less prone to currency crises during
the last two decades. In contrast to the ﬁndings in the earlier currency crises
literature, the ability of the models to signal currency crises out-of-sample was
found to be weak. In particular, of the currency crises of late 1990s, only the
Russian 1998 crisis could have been predicted out-of-sample. It also reinforces




Working Paper Series No. 571
January 2006References
[1] Agenor, P.-R., J. Bhandari and R. Flood, 1991, Speculative attacks and
models of balance of payment crises, NBER Working Paper 3919.
[2] Aghion, P., P. Bacchetta and A. Banerjee, 2001, Currency Crises and Mon-
etary Policy in an Economy with Credit Constraints, European Economic
Review 45, 1121-1150.
[3] –––—, 2004, A Corporate Balance-Sheet Approach to Currency Crises,
Journal of Economic Theory 119(1), 6-30.
[4] Anders, U. and O. Korn, 1999, Model Selection in Neural Networks, Neural
Networks 12, 309-323.
[5] Berg, A. and C. Patillo, 1999, Predicting Currency Crises: The Indicators
approach and alternative, Journal of International Money and Finance 18,
561-586.
[6] Blanco, H. and P. Garber, 1986, Recurrent Devaluations and Speculative
A t t a c k so nt h eM e x i c a nP e s o ,Journal of Political Economy 94, 148-166.
[7] Bordo, M., B. Eichengreen, D. Klingebiel, and M. Martinez-Peria, 2001,
Financial Crises - Lessons from the last 120 years, Economic Policy 16(32),
52-82.
[8] Burkart, O. and V. Coudert, 2002, Leading indicators of currency crises for
emerging countries, Emerging Markets Review 3, 107-133.
[9] Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo, 2004, Government Guaran-
tees and Self-Fulﬁlling Speculative Attacks, Journal of Economic Theory
119(1), 31-63.
[10] Bussière, M. and M. Fratzscher, 2002, Towards a new Early Warning Sys-
tem of ﬁnancial crises, ECB WP No. 145.
[11] Chang, R. and A. Velasco, 1998, Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: A
Canonical Model, NBER Working Paper No. 6606.
[12] Cumby, R. and S. van Wijnbergen, 1989, Financial Policy and Speculative
Runs with a Crawling Peg: Argentina 1979-81, Journal of International
Economics 27, 111-127.
[13] DARPA, 1988, Neural Network Study (AFCEA International Press).
[14] Dickey, D. and W. Fuller, 1981, Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive
time series with a unit root, Econometrica 49, 1057—1072.
[15] Edison, H., 2003, Do indicators of ﬁnancial crises work? An evaluation of
an early warning system, International Journal of Finance and Economics
8, 11-53.
[16] Edwards, S., 1989, Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and Adjustment:
Exchange Rate Policies in Developing Countries (MIT Press).
23
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 571
January 2006[17] Eichengreen, B., A. Rose and C. Wyplosz, 1995, Exchange Market May-
hem: The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks, Economic
Policy 21, 249-312.
[18] Eichengreen, B., A. Rose and C. Wyplosz, 1996, Contagious currency crises.
First tests, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 98(4), 463-484.
[19] Forbes, K., and R. Rigobon, 2002, No Contagion, Only Interdependence:
Measuring Stock Market Comovements, Journal of Finance 57, 2223—2261.
[20] Flood, R. and N. Marion, 1998, Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crises
Literature, NBER Working Paper 6380.
[21] Franck, R. and A. Schmied, Predicting currency crisis contagion from East
Asia to Russia and Brazil: an artiﬁcial neural network approach, AMCB
Working Paper No 2/2003, Aharon Meir Center for Banking.
[22] Frankel, J. and A. Rose, 1996, Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An
Empirical Treatment, Journal of International Economics 41, 351-66.
[23] Girton, L. and D. Roper, 1977, A Monetary Model of Exchange Market
Pressure Applied to Postwar Canadian Experience, American Economic
Review 67, 537-548.
[24] Greene, W., 2000, Econometric Analysis, 4th edition (Prentice Hall Inter-
national, London).
[25] Ghosh, A., A.-M. Gulde and H. Wolf, 2002, Exchange Rate Regimes -
Choices & Consequences (The MIT Press, Cambridge).
[26] Goldberg, L., 1994, Predicting Exchange Rate Crises: Mexico Revisited,
Journal of International Economics 36, 413-430.
[27] Haykin, S., 1999, Neural Networks - A Comprehensive Foundation 2nd
edition (Prentice Hall, New Jersey).
[28] Hornik, K., M. Stinchcombe and H. White, 1989, Multilayer feedforward
networks are universal approximators, Neural Networks 2, 359-366.
[29] International Monetary Fund, 1998, World Economic Outlook May 1998.
[30] Kaminsky, G., 2003, Varieties of Currency Crises, NBER Working Paper
10193.
[31] Kaminsky, G., S. Lizondo and C. Reinhart, 1998, Leading Indicators of
Currency Crises, IMF Staﬀ Papers 45, 1-48.
[32] Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart, 1996, The twin crises: the causes of banking
and balance-of-payments problems. International Finance Discussion Paper
No. 544. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
[33] Komulainen, T. and J. Lukkarila, 2003, What drives ﬁnancial crises in
emerging markets?, Emerging Markets Review 4, 248-272.
[34] Krugman, P., 1979, A model of balance of payments crises, Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 11, 311-325.
24
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 571
January 2006[35] –––—, 1999, Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises,
International Tax and Public Finance 6, 459-472.
[36] Kumar, M., U. Moorthy and W. Perraudin, 2003, Predicting emerging
market currency crashes, Journal of Empirical Finance 10, 427-454.
[37] Levin, A., C.-F. Lin and C.-S. Chu, 2002, Unit Root Tests in Panel Data:
Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties, Journal of Econometrics 108,
1-24.
[38] Im, K., M. H. Pesaran and Y. Shin, 2003, Testing for Unit Roots in Het-
erogeneous Panels, Journal of Econometrics 115, 53-74.
[39] McKinnon, R. and H. Pill, 1996, Credible Liberalizations and International
Capital Flows: The ‘Overborrowing Syndrome’, in: Ito, T. and Kruger, A.
eds., Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia (NBER and the
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London).
[40] McNelis, P., 2005, Neural Networks with Evolutionary Computation: Pre-
dictive Edge in the Market (Elsevier Academic Press).
[41] Obstfeld, M., 1986, Rational and Self-Fulﬁlling Balance of Payments Crises,
American Economic Review 76, 72-81.
[42] –––—, 1995, International Currency Experience: New Lessons and
Lessons Relearned, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 119-220.
[43] Phillips, P. and P. Perron, 1988, Testing for a unit root in time series
regression, Biometrika 75, 335—346.
[44] Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoﬀ, 2004, The Modern History of Exchange
Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CXIX(1), 1-48.
[45] Rogoﬀ, K., A. Husain, A. Mody, R. Brooks and N. Oomes, 2003, Evolution
and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes, International Monetary Fund
Working Paper WP/03/243.
[46] Rumelhart, D., G. Hinton and R. Williams, 1986, Learning Internal Rep-
resentations by Back-Propagating Errors, Nature 323, 533-536.
[47] Sachs, J., A. Tornell and A. Velasco, 1995, Financial Crises in Emerging
Markets: The Lessons from 1995, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
10(1), 147-198.
[48] Schumacher, M., R. Rossner and W. Vach, 1996, Neural networks and
logistic regression: Part I, Computational Statistics and Data Analysis 21,
661-682.
[49] Scott, C., 2000, An Exploration of Currency Contagion using the South-
East Asian Economic Crisis and Neural Networks, Mimeo.
[50] Tudela, M., 2004, Explaining Currency Crises, A Duration Model Ap-
proach, Journal of International Money and Finance 23, 799-816.
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 571
January 2006[51] White, H., 1989, Learning in artiﬁcial neural networks: A statistical per-
spective, Neural Computation 1, 425-464.
[52] Wong, B. and Y., Selvi, 1998, Neural network applications in ﬁnance: A




Working Paper Series No. 571
January 20067A p p e n d i x
7.1 Data sources and transformations
Table 2 shows the data sources and sample period of the variables that were
used to construct the crisis indicator and the independent variables. In the
table, IFS refers to the IMF International Financial Statistics 2/2005, JPMor-
gan refers to JPMorgan’s Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate (REER) accessed at
www.morganmarkets.com. Finally, GFD refers to Global Financial Data Inc.,
which database was accessed at www.globalﬁndata.com.
Variables for crisis index Source Frequency, period
Exchange rate national currency per U.S. dollar IMF IFS line AE Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Total reserves minus gold IMF IFS line 1L.D Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Variables for independent variables Source Frequency, period
Gross Domestic Product IMF IFS line 99B Annual, 1980 - 2001
GDP deflator IMF IFS line 99BIP Annual, 1980 - 2001
Current Account IMF IFS line 78ALD Annual, 1980 - 2001
Government budget balance IMF IFS line 80 Annual, 1980 - 2001
Domestic credit IMF IFS line 32 Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Money IMF IFS line 34 Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Quasi-money IMF IFS lines 35 Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Consumer Prices IMF IFS line 64 Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Changes in consumer prices IMF IFS line 64.X Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) IMF IFS line REC / JPMorgan Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Composite stock index GFD / IMF IFS line 62 Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Deposit rate IMF IFS line 60L Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Exchange rate regime (de facto) Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) Monthly, 1980:1 - 2001:12
Table 2: Data sources and frequencies.
The following data conversions were made. Firstly, the annual data obser-
vations: the GDP, the GDP deﬂator, current account and government budget
balance were linearly interpolated into monthly frequency. Secondly, JPMorgan
REER was used in the following cases: Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ko-
rea, Mexico, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey. In all other cases, the data from IFS
was used. In addition, some observations (numbers in parenthesis) of REER
were linearly interpolated in the following countries: Morocco (4 obs.), Poland
(1 obs.), and Venezuela (5 obs.). The measure of under or overvaluation of
REER was calculated subtracting from REER the trend, which was calculated
using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a parameter of 14400. Thirdly, stock mar-
ket indices were taken from Global Financial Data Inc. with the exception of
Brazil, in which case, data from IFS was used. In Morocco 6 observations were
linearly interpolated. Fourthly, in case of Hungary, Money, Quasi-Money and
Domestic credit were available on quarterly basis 12/1987 - 12/1997 and there-
fore the missing observations (49 obs. per variable) for this period were linearly
interpolated. Fifthly, the real interest rate was calculated using deposit rate
subtracted by consumer price inﬂation. In the case of India, money market rate
was used instead. Finally, GDP deﬂator was missing for Russia and therefore
the CPI was used to deﬂate the Russian GDP.
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Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables in levels. In the models,
all variables were expressed in natural logarithms with the exception of real
interest rate and the dummy variables. Furthermore, real GDP, real domestic
credit, ratio of broad money to foreign reserves and stock market composite
index were expressed as annualized growth rates. Table 4 presents the countries,
the number of observations, the number of crises and tranquil periods and the
s h a r eo fc r i s e so ft h et o t a ln u m b e ro fc r i s e si ne a c hc o u n t r y .
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crisis indicator 3706 0.0366972 0.1880428 0 1
Ratio of government budget balance to GDP 3706 -0.0273134 0.0365802 -0.2608266 0.0525756
Ratio of current account to GDP 3706 -0.0208352 0.0463155 -0.2093936 0.1829959
Measure of under or overvaluation of REER  3706 0.0005456 0.0686768 -0.5418338 0.7379388
Real interest rate 3706 0.082609 14.45685 -163.7298 504.7866
Real GDP 3706 4.65E+13 2.12E+14 1.45E+08 1.25E+15
Real domestic credit 3706 1.46E+13 7.46E+13 1.196855 8.29E+14
Ratio of broad money to foreign reserves 3706 6.496915 10.01548 0.8051434 134.3178
Stock market composite index 3706 2351.651 9322.714 1.36E-10 336200.8
Dummy for hyperinflation 3706 0.1681058 0.3740107 0 1
Dummy for contagion 3706 0.0099838 0.0994324 0 1
Dummy for de facto pegged FX regime 3706 0.1573125 0.3641442 0 1
Dummy for de facto crawling ped FX regime 3706 0.3354021 0.4721945 0 1
Dummy for de facto managed float FX regime 3706 0.2884512 0.4531032 0 1
Dummy for de facto floating FX regime 3706 0.0348084 0.183319 0 1
Dummy for de facto freely falling FX regime 3706 0.1643281 0.3706231 0 1
Dummy for Latin America 3706 0.3472747 0.4761682 0 1
Dummy for Europe 3706 0.1511063 0.3582008 0 1
Dummy for Asia 3706 0.361306 0.4804438 0 1
Dummy for Africa 3706 0.140313 0.3473584 0 1
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of original variables.
Country Frequency Crises Tranquil Crises %
Argentina 192 8 184 4.17
Brazil 194 14 180 7.22
Chile 240 3 237 1.25
Colombia 130 6 124 4.62
Czech Republic 95 3 92 3.16
Ecuador 93 8 85 8.60
E g y p t 9 509 5 0 . 0 0
Hungary 76 0 76 0.00
India 244 5 239 2.05
Indonesia 220 6 214 2.73
Israel 216 15 201 6.94
Korea 204 3 201 1.47
Malaysia 178 9 169 5.06
Mexico 58 0 58 0.00
M o r o c c o 9 128 9 2 . 2 0
Peru 167 6 161 3.59
Philippines 242 17 225 7.02
Poland 90 1 89 1.11
R u s s i a 7 217 1 1 . 3 9
Slovakia 60 1 59 1.67
South Africa 118 3 115 2.54
Thailand 251 10 241 3.98
Turkey 167 6 161 3.59
Venezuela 213 9 204 4.23
Total 3706 136 3570 3.67
Table 4: List of countries and frequencies of crises and tranquil periods.
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Dependent variable: binary currency crisis indicator
Independent variables (t-1), marginal effects: 1 2 3 4
12/1980 - 12/2001 12/1980 - 12/1989 1/1990 - 12/2001 12/1980 - 12/1996
Goverment budget balance to GDP -0.13559** -0.11911** 0.0750 -0.22254***
[0.05705] [0.05597] [0.11174] [0.06392]
Current account to GDP -0.18799*** -0.19525*** -0.0853 -0.0643
[0.06154] [0.08788] [0.07842] [0.08246]
Over/undervaluation of REER 0.0333 0.07626** 0.0051 0.07319**
[0.02383] [0.04032] [0.02839] [0.03684]
Real interest rate 0.00031** 0.00052* 0.00034*** 0.00024**
[0.00013] [0.00032] [0.00012] [0.00012]
Growth rate of real GDP -0.07459** -0.10466** -0.07843** -0.1036
[0.03271] [0.05197] [0.03358] [0.07167]
Growth rate of real domestic credit 0.0019 0.0019 0.0026 0.0011
[0.00159] [0.00210] [0.00189] [0.00169]
Growth rate of broad money to foreign reserves 0.00368** 0.0028 0.0020 0.00419*
[0.00167] [0.00194] [0.00246] [0.00214]
Growth rate of stock market 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0022
[0.00033] [0.00209] [0.00038] [0.00190]
Hyperinflation 0.0102 0.03445*** -0.0055 0.03051**
[0.00932] [0.02026] [0.00828] [0.01703]
Contagion 0.15015*** 0.18352*** 0.1128**
[0.07144] [0.08577] [0.08680]
Pegged FX regime -0.0292*** 0.0074 -0.03587*** -0.0074
[0.00400] [0.01119] [0.00484] [0.00997]
Crawling peg FX regime -0.04378*** -0.0053 -0.04397*** -0.0083
[0.00691] [0.00761] [0.00654] [0.00962]
Managed floating FX regime -0.0221*** 0.02101* -0.03487*** 0.0074
[0.00555] [0.01666] [0.00732] [0.01248]
Floating FX regime -0.0119 -0.0147
[0.00641] [0.00615]
Latin America -0.0047 -0.01992*** 0.0204 -0.0097
[0.00725] [0.00878] [0.01439] [0.00780]
Europe -0.01948*** -0.0020 -0.0141
[0.00487] [0.01188] [0.00696]
Asia 0.02969*** -0.0147 0.05807*** -0.0045
[0.01096] [0.01189] [0.02205] [0.01040]
Observations 3706 1010 2662 2375
Log-likelihood -481.09498 -100.74794 -348.60976 -288.77926
Pseudo R2 0.1747 0.3650 0.1759 0.1747
Wald statistics β=0 176.92 114.80 140.09 114.36
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Models for in-sample predictions Out-of-sample predictions
Robust standard errors (cluster) in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the 
independent variables. For continuos variables, the reported marginal effects are elasticities, for dummy variables, the marginal effects denote the shift from value 
0 to 1. All models included linear and quadratic time trends. Dummy variables for contagion, floating FX regime and European countries for samples 12/1980-
12/1989 are dropped due to time invariance, missing observations or collinearity. Similarly, floating FX regime is dropped for the model 4 for the same reasons.
Table 5: Probit model estimates.
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Number of Share of Sensitivity Specificity Share of  Pearson P-value Cramer's
crises predicted predicted crises Pr(crisis>th) | crisis Pr(crisis<th) | tranquil correctly classfied obs Chi square test V
Model 1
Threshold (th)
0.10 65 47.79 % 47.79 % 93.00 % 91.34 % 280.2913 0.000 0.2750
0.15 47 34.56 % 34.56 % 97.12 % 94.82 % 341.1984 0.000 0.3034
0.25 26 19.12 % 19.12 % 99.30 % 96.36 % 327.4237 0.000 0.2972
0.50 5 3.68 % 3.68 % 100.00 % 96.47 % 131.4273 0.000 0.1883
Model 2
Threshold (th)
0.10 21 56.76 % 56.76 % 95.79 % 94.36 % 170.7912 0.000 0.4112
0.15 21 56.76 % 56.76 % 97.53 % 96.04 % 246.7961 0.000 0.4943
0.25 18 48.65 % 48.65 % 98.56 % 96.73 % 258.9473 0.000 0.5063
0.50 13 35.14 % 35.14 % 99.69 % 97.33 % 277.3045 0.000 0.5240
Model 3
Threshold (th)
0.10 46 46.46 % 46.46 % 92.12 % 90.42 % 167.9580 0.000 0.2512
0.15 34 34.34 % 34.34 % 97.27 % 94.93 % 253.7284 0.000 0.3087
0.25 19 19.19 % 19.19 % 99.53 % 96.54 % 290.3311 0.000 0.3302
0.50 8 8.08 % 8.08 % 99.84 % 96.43 % 133.3936 0.000 0.2239
Model 1 refers to an estimation sample of 12/1980 - 12/2001, model 2 to a sample of 12/1980 - 12/1989 and model 3 to a sample of 1/1990 - 12/2001. 
Table 6: Probit model in-sample forecasts, exact timing of crisis predicted
correctly.
Number of Share of Sensitivity Specificity Share of  Pearson P-value Cramer's
crises predicted predicted crises Pr(crisis>th) | crisis Pr(crisis<th) | tranquil correctly classfied obs Chi square test V
Model 1
Threshold (th)
0.10 62 45.59 % 45.59 % 99.16 % 97.19 % 1100.0000 0.000 0.5407
0.15 62 45.59 % 45.59 % 99.24 % 97.27 % 1100.0000 0.000 0.5506
0.25 61 44.85 % 44.85 % 99.33 % 97.33 % 1100.0000 0.000 0.5549
0.50 47 34.56 % 34.56 % 99.94 % 97.54 % 1200.0000 0.000 0.5679
Model 2
Threshold (th)
0.10 28 75.68 % 75.68 % 95.79 % 95.05 % 285.9871 0.000 0.5321
0.15 23 62.16 % 62.16 % 99.69 % 98.32 % 543.7519 0.000 0.7337
0.25 23 62.16 % 62.16 % 99.69 % 98.32 % 543.7519 0.000 0.7337
0.50 23 62.16 % 62.16 % 99.79 % 98.41 % 566.8068 0.000 0.7491
Model 3
Threshold (th)
0.10 42 42.42 % 42.42 % 99.10 % 96.99 % 690.0247 0.000 0.5091
0.15 42 42.42 % 42.42 % 99.34 % 97.22 % 767.0198 0.000 0.5368
0.25 42 42.42 % 42.42 % 99.53 % 97.41 % 844.2664 0.000 0.5632
0.50 41 41.41 % 41.41 % 99.61 % 97.45 % 853.6705 0.000 0.5663
Model 1 refers to an estimation sample of 12/1980 - 12/2001, model 2 to a sample of 12/1980 - 12/1989 and model 3 to a sample of 1/1990 - 12/2001. 
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crises predicted predicted crises Pr(crisis>th) | crisis Pr(crisis<th) | tranquil correctly classfied obs Chi square test V
Model 1
Threshold (th)
0.10 71 52.21 % 47.79 % 94.53 % 88.48 % 1400.0000 0.000 0.4312
0.15 55 40.44 % 34.56 % 98.17 % 90.53 % 1100.0000 0.000 0.384
0.25 30 22.06 % 19.12 % 99.52 % 90.31 % 536.9549 0.000 0.2692
0.50 5 3.68 % 3.68 % 100.00 % 89.94 % 131.4273 0.000 0.1883
Model 2
Threshold (th)
0.10 25 67.57 % 56.76 % 97.66 % 90.79 % 517.0086 0.000 0.5059
0.15 22 59.46 % 56.76 % 98.77 % 91.09 % 521.0565 0.000 0.5079
0.25 22 59.46 % 48.65 % 99.33 % 90.79 % 453.4256 0.000 0.4738
0.50 13 35.14 % 35.14 % 99.78 % 90.00 % 309.5407 0.000 0.3915
Model 3
Threshold (th)
0.10 48 48.48 % 46.46 % 92.99 % 86.74 % 728.3261 0.000 0.3699
0.15 38 38.38 % 34.34 % 97.96 % 90.27 % 651.1157 0.000 0.3497
0.25 20 20.20 % 19.19 % 99.71 % 90.69 % 428.1128 0.000 0.2836
0.50 9 9.09 % 8.08 % 99.87 % 90.27 % 161.9941 0.000 0.1744
Model 1 refers to an estimation sample of 12/1980 - 12/2001, model 2 to a sample of 12/1980 - 12/1989 and model 3 to a sample of 1/1990 - 12/2001. 
Table 8: Probit model in-sample forecasts, timing of crisis predicted within t-3
and t.
Number of  Share of Sensitivity Specificity Share of  Pearson P-value Cramer's
crises predicted predicted crises Pr(crisis>th) | crisis Pr(crisis<th) | tranquil correctly classfied obs Chi square test V
Model 1
Threshold (th)
0.10 63 46.32 % 45.59 % 99.64 % 91.64 % 1600.0000 0.000 0.4689
0.15 63 46.32 % 45.59 % 99.64 % 91.55 % 1600.0000 0.000 0.4626
0.25 62 45.59 % 44.85 % 99.67 % 91.50 % 1600.0000 0.000 0.4574
0.50 47 34.56 % 34.56 % 100.00 % 91.12 % 1300.0000 0.000 0.4153
Model 2
Threshold (th)
0.10 30 81.08 % 75.68 % 96.88 % 90.10 % 522.6972 0.000 0.5087
0.15 23 62.16 % 62.16 % 99.78 % 90.99 % 579.0866 0.000 0.5354
0.25 23 62.16 % 62.16 % 99.78 % 90.99 % 579.0866 0.000 0.5354
0.50 23 62.16 % 62.16 % 99.78 % 90.89 % 566.8212 0.000 0.7491
Model 3
Threshold (th)
0.10 43 43.43 % 42.42 % 99.46 % 91.51 % 978.5009 0.000 0.4287
0.15 42 42.42 % 42.42 % 99.62 % 91.58 % 1000.0000 0.000 0.4374
0.25 42 42.42 % 42.42 % 99.79 % 91.70 % 1100.0000 0.000 0.4515
0.50 42 42.42 % 41.41 % 99.79 % 91.58 % 1000.0000 0.000 0.4396
Model 1 refers to an estimation sample of 12/1980 - 12/2001, model 2 to a sample of 12/1980 - 12/1989 and model 3 to a sample of 1/1990 - 12/2001. 
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Number of Share of Sensitivity Specificity Share of  Pearson P-value Cramer's
crises predicted predicted crises Pr(crisis>th) | crisis Pr(crisis<th) | tranquil correctly classfied obs Chi-squared test V
Model 4 probit 
Threshold (th)
0.10 3 5.36 % 5.36 % 98.61 % 94.52 % 5.4674 0.019 0.0654
0.15 1 1.79 % 1.79 % 99.75 % 95.46 % 4.0712 0.044 0.0564
0.25 0 0.00 % 0.00 % 99.92 % 95.54 % 0.0459 0.830 -0.0060
0.50 0 0.00 % 0.00 % 100.00 % 95.62 % . . .
Model 4 ANN 
Threshold (th)
0.10 1 1.79 % 1.79 % 99.18 % 94.91 % 0.5872 0.443 0.0214
0.15 1 1.79 % 1.79 % 99.35 % 95.08 % 0.9796 0.322 0.0277
0.25 1 1.79 % 1.79 % 99.35 % 95.08 % 0.9796 0.322 0.0277
0.50 1 1.79 % 1.79 % 99.67 % 95.38 % 2.9224 0.087 0.0478
Model 4 refers to a forecasting sample of 1/1997 - 12/2001. 
Table 10: Out-of-sample forecasts for probit and ANN models, exact timing of
crisis predicted correctly.
Number of  Share of Sensitivity Specificity Share of  Pearson P-value Cramer's
crises predicted predicted crises Pr(crisis>th) | crisis Pr(crisis<th) | tranquil correctly classfied obs Chi-squared test V
Model 4 probit
Threshold (th)
0.10 4 7.14 % 5.36 % 98.77 % 88.65 % 52.4617 0.000 0.1433
0.15 1 1.79 % 1.79 % 99.74 % 89.13 % 4.2388 0.120 0.0576
0.25 0 0.00 % 0.00 % 99.91 % 89.20 % 0.1202 0.942 0.0097
0.50 0 0.00 % 0.00 % 100.00 % 89.28 % . . .
Model 4 ANN
Threshold (th)
0.10 2 3.57 % 1.79 % 99.30 % 88.89 % 31.0851 0.000 0.1103
0.15 2 3.57 % 1.79 % 99.47 % 89.04 % 31.6118 0.000 0.1112
0.25 2 3.57 % 1.79 % 99.47 % 89.04 % 31.6118 0.000 0.1112
0.50 1 1.79 % 1.79 % 99.74 % 89.20 % 19.0219 0.001 0.0863
Model 4 refers to a forecasting sample of 1/1997 - 12/2001. 
Table 11: Out-of-sample forecast for probit and ANN models, timing of crisis
predicted within t-3 and t.
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Out-of-sample
123 4
Probit model 12/1980 - 12/2001 12/1980 - 12/1989 1/1990 - 12/2001 1/1997 - 12/2001
Mean probability of outcome (crisis) 0.0367 0.0366 0.0372 0.0438
Mean probability of forecast 0.0367 0.0367 0.0370 0.0145
ROC area 0.7841 0.8758 0.7866 0.6335
Brier Quadratic Probability Score 0.0307 0.0239 0.0313 0.0420
Sander's modified Quadratic Probability Score 0.0326 0.0300 0.0334 0.0420
Spiegelhalter's z-statistic -0.5005 -0.1934 -0.1576 8.9898
P-value 0.6916 0.5767 0.5626 0.0000
ANN model
Mean probability of outcome (crisis) 0.0367 0.0366 0.0372 0.0438
Mean probability of forecast 0.0174 0.0293 0.0363 0.0068
ROC area 0.7226 0.8671 0.7115 0.4687
Brier Quadratic Probability Score 0.0231 0.0155 0.0243 0.0459
Sander's modified Quadratic Probability Score 0.0284 0.0273 0.0287 0.0442
Spiegelhalter's z-statistic 55.9788 6.1077 0.5507 33.1186
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.2909 0.0000
In-sample
Table 12: Goodness-of-ﬁt measures.
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2 BF multin. logit
3
Share of observations correctly classified 90.3 % 91.5 % 77.0 % 81.0 % 83.9 %
Share of crises correctly classified 22.1 % 45.6 % 41.0 % 44.0 % 73.7 %
Share of tranquil periods correctly classified 99.5 % 99.7 % 85.0 % 89.0 % 95.0 %
Share of false alarms of total alarms 41.2%+ 26.2%++ 63.0 % 57.0 % 44.1 %
1) Threshold 25%. (Pre)crisis period is correctly classified when the estimated probability of crisis is above the cut-off probability and a crisis ensues 
    within 3 months. Estimation sample: 12/1980 - 12/2001 with 24 countries. 
    + There were a total of 51 alarms of which 21 were incorrect, ++ there were a total of 84 alarms of which 22 were incorrect.
2) Source: Berg and Pattillo (1999), page 570 with a threshold 25%. KLR refers to Kaminsky et al. (1998), while BP probit refers to Berg and Patillo (1999). 
    (Pre)crisis period is correctly classified when the estimated probability of crisis is above the cut-off probability and a crisis ensues within 24 months. 
    Estimation sample: 1/1970 - 4/1995 with 23 countries.
3) Source: Bussière and Fratzscher (2002), page 25 with a threshold of 20%. (Pre)crisis period is correctly classified when the estimated probability of
    crisis is above the cut-off probability and a crisis ensues within 12 months. Estimation sample: 12/1993 - 9/2001 with 20 countries.





2 KL RE probit
3
Share of observations correctly classified 89.2 % 89.0 % 69.0 % 76.0 % 89.2 %
Share of crises correctly classified 0.0 % 3.6 % 25.0 % 16.0 % 50.0 %
Share of tranquil periods correctly classified 99.9 % 99.5 % 85.0 % 93.0 % 95.2 %
Share of false alarms of total alarms 100%* 71.4%** 63.0 % 61.0 % 10.0 %
1) Threshold 25%. (Pre)crisis period is correctly classified when the estimated probability of crisis is above the cut-off probability 
     and a crisis ensues within 3 months. Forecasting sample: 1/1997 - 12/2001 with 24 countries. 
     * There was only 1 alarm, which was incorrect, ** there were 7 signals of which 5 were incorrect.
2) Source: Berg and Pattillo (1999), page 576 with a threshold 25%. KLR refers to Kaminsky et al. (1998), while BP probit refers to Berg and Patillo (1999). 
    (Pre)crisis period is correctly classified when the estimated probability of crisis is above the cut-off probability and a crisis ensues within 24 months. 
    Forecasting sample: 5/1995 - 12/1997 with 23 countries.
3) Source: Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003), page 259 with a threshold of 25%. (Pre)crisis period is correctly classified when the estimated probability
     of crisis is above the cut-off probability and a crisis ensues within 12 months.  Forecasting sample: 1/1997 - 12/2001 with 31 countries.
Table 14: Comparision of out-of-sample forecasts to selected earlier papers.
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Out-of-sample: one month ahead predictions
Figure 3: Currency crisis predictions for Brazil.
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Out-of-sample: one month ahead predictions
Figure 5: Currency crisis predictions for Colombia.
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Figure 7: Currency crisis predictions for Ecuador.
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Figure 9: Currency crisis predictions for Hungary.
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Out-of-sample: one month ahead predictions







1985m1 1990m1 1995m1 2000m1








1997m1 1998m7 2000m1 2001m7
Currency crisis Probit ANN
Out-of-sample: one month ahead predictions
Figure 11: Currency crisis predictions for Indonesia.
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Figure 13: Currency crisis predictions for Korea.
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Out-of-sample: one month ahead predictions
Figure 15: Currency crisis predictions for Mexico.
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Out-of-sample: one month ahead predictions
Figure 17: Currency crisis predictions for Peru.
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Figure 19: Currency crisis predictions for Poland.
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Figure 21: Currency crisis predictions for South Africa.
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Out-of-sample: one month ahead predictions
Figure 23: Currency crisis predictions for Thailand.
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Figure 25: Currency crisis predictions for Venezuela.
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